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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROSECUTORIAL

CONDUCT-SANCTIONS-The

MIS-

Third Circuit Court of Appeals has

held that prosecutorial witholding of evidence alleged to be exculpatory material will not result in a violation of the doctrine established in Brady v. Maryland if such evidence is discovered before
trial and possible prejudice to the defendant.
United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1984).
John Starusko, a real estate tax assessor in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, was charged by the United States with participating
in a tax scheme to extort money in exchange for the lowering of
county tax assessments.1 A pre-trial hearing was held on June 3,
1983 during which the district court, at the request of the defendant, issued a disclosure order directing the government to turn
over to the defense all exculpatory material2 in its possession.3
This material was to include all evidence that could be used by the
defendant to impeach the government's witnesses.4 The order was
made pursuant to the rule of Brady v. Maryland.' The district
court warned that if the material were not disclosed by June 6,
1983, a date two weeks in advance of the scheduled date of trial,
those witnesses subject to impeachment by the exculpatory material would be precluded from testifying at the trial. The government voiced no objections to the order.6
At the time that the order was issued, the government had in its
possession three FBI reports which were based on interviews with
one Patrick Logan, another tax assessor and the mastermind of the
tax assessment scheme, who was the government's key witness.7
1. United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. Id. Exculpatory material is defined to include material that goes to the heart of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, as well as that which might well alter the jury's judgment of
the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1983); United States ex rel.
Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1978).
3. 729 F.2d at 258.
4. Id.
5. Id. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
6. 729 F.2d at 258.
7. Id.

839

840

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:839

The reports contained conflicting summaries of statements made
by Logan concerning the defendant's knowledge of Logan's involvement in the tax assessment scheme.'
The government did not release the reports to the defendant by
the deadline, but the first and third reports were made available
during the week before the trial.' The second report, which indicated that Starusko had no knowledge of Logan's involvement in
the scheme, was not turned over to the defense. However, defense
counsel acquired possession of this report from a third party a few
days before the date of the trial. 10
Believing that the second report was exculpatory material that
should have been released to him pursuant to the district court's
8. Id. The reports are indicated in the margin of the opinion and read as follows:
The first F.B.I. report, which covers an April 20, 1982 interview with Logan, provides
in relevant part:
[iun regards to an assessment fixed by John Starusko in the Elizabeth Township, Pa., Logan admitted that Starusko knew the complete details concerning
the fact that Logan was going to receive money for the fixing of this assessment; but Logan said that Starusko did not receive any money from that deal.
According to Logan, it would not have been possible for him to have completed
that deal without Starusko's help and he would not have received any money if
Starusko had not aided him by getting on the telephone and talking with Sullivan and explaining to him that the assessment in Elizabeth Township had
been adjusted.
The second F.B.I. report, which relates to an April 21, 1982 interview with Logan,
provides in pertinent part:
Logan was then asked questions concerning some of the statement [sic] he had
made the previous day auring the first contact he had with the interviewing
agents. He basically changed the statements he had made concerning Lou Vitsas and John Starusko. In regards to those two individuals, he denied saying
that they knew anything about the fact that he was going to receive money for
adjusting assessments on business properties. He mentioned that neither individual ever received money from him for any help they may have provided in
the lowering of these assessments.
The third F.B.I. report, which concerns a June 11, 1982 interview with Logan, provides in relevant part:
In either the second or the third telephone conversation, Logan told Starusko
that if the assessment was lowered on the property, Logan could get something
out of it. In response to the statement by Logan that Logan could get something in return for a lower assessment, Starusko replied, "I don't want to know
nothing." Starusko eventually agreed to lower the assessment on the property
in the words of Logan, "As a favor to me." Starusko did not want anything for
agreeing to lower the assessment. Sullivan gave Logan a. . . bribe in return for
having the assessed value on the property . . . lowered. Logan told Sullivan
that Starusko was getting some of the money. . . because Logan wanted Sullivan to give Logan the money.
729 F.2d at 258 n.1.
9. Id. at 259.
10. Id.
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order, Starusko filed a motion in limine wherein he requested that
the government be sanctioned by refusing to allow Logan to testify." The government argued against such a sanction;12 after argument, the district court agreed with the defendant13 and entered
an order wherein it precluded Logan from testifying. 14 The government then filed an appeal"5 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.1"
In its appeal, the government argued that the sanction imposed
by the district court was an abuse of that court's discretion.17 According to the government, the district court had erred in basing
the sanction on the government's failure to release the Brady material because the second FBI report was not Brady material;"8
that even if it were, the district court was without authority to order its release prior to trial; and that the failure to release the
Brady material was not so detrimental to the defendant as to have
violated the Brady rule.'"
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the government and concluded that the second FBI report had indeed been
Brady material.20 According to the court, Brady requires the government to turn over to the defense all evidence which is both exculpatory and material. 2' Since Logan was a key prosecution witness, the court determined that any evidence which could impeach
his credibility was clearly exculpatory.22 In addition, the court held
that since the second FBI report not only affected Logan's credibility, but also shed light on the underlying questions of substantive guilt, it was material and should have been turned over to the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 260.
16. 18 U.S'C. § 3731 (1977) provides, in pertinent part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order
of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of
seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put
in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the
United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for
purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the
proceeding.
Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

729 F.2d at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defense.23
Having disposed of the government's first contention, the court
proceeded to reject its second argument by simply reaffirming the
position that it had adopted in United States v. Higgs,2 ' where the
court had held that a district court has the general discretionary
authority to order the pre-trial disclosure of Brady material.25
Finally, the court turned its attention to the district court's preclusion order, and determined that the district court had abused
its discretion in issuing that order.2
The court began its discussion by noting that the imposition of
sanctions against the government is proper only in those situations
where the defendant establishes that the nondisclosure of Brady
material infringed upon his right to a fair trial, thereby depriving
him of due process of law.2 7 The court then went on to explain that
if the Starusko matter had proceeded to trial and Patrick Logan
had testified to a fact bearing materially on Starusko's guilt or innocence, the failure to disclose the second FBI report prior to trial
would have constituted a clear violation of due process. 2 The court
pointed out, however, that since no trial had occurred and that
since the government's failure to disclose the Brady material had
been discovered before the scheduled date of trial, Starusko's due
process rights had not been violated.2 9 Since Starusko's due process rights had remained intact, the court reasoned that the defendant had suffered no prejudice from the government's failure to
disclose the second FBI report.30 Absent a showing of prejudice,
the court determined that the Brady rule had not been violated.31
This in turn meant that the district court had abused its discretion
in basing its preclusion order or any other sanction on a Brady
32

violation.

Although the court reversed the district court's order, it ex23. Id. (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
24. 713 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1983). The Higgs court held that a district court may order
pre-trial disclosure of Brady material. However, the Higgs court also held that the trial
court had abused its discretion in not allowing certain witnesses to testify since "appellees'
due process rights would [have] be[en] satisfied . . . as long as disclosure [had been] made
the day that the government witnesses [were] scheduled to testify in court." Id. at 44.
25. 729 F.2d at 261.
26. Id. at 261-62.
27. Id. at 262.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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plained that it did not approve of the government's action. The
court rejected the argument that the government, not the court,
was better able to determine whether evidence qualified as Brady
material. The court determined, therefore, that even if there were
disagreement as to the nature of the evidence, once the trial court
had issued a pre-trial disclosure order based on Brady, the prosecution must respond. Thereafter any determination as to the relevancy of the evidence under Brady is to be made by the trial
court."3
The roots of the Starusko decision may be traced to Brady v.
Maryland 4 and its predecessors, the earliest of which is Mooney v.
Holohan.3 5 In Mooney the Supreme Court held that the intentional and purposeful use of perjured testimony by the prosecution
to obtain a conviction smacked of a denial of due process. 6 In Pyle
33. Id. at 261-63. The court was of the opinion that the government's classification of
the evidence as Jencks Act material was erroneous, in that the second F.B.I. report was not
a "statement" as defined in the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1977). The Jencks Act provides, in
parts pertinent to the court's consideration of the evidence, as follows:
Demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report
in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of
subpena [sic], discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United
States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the
entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his
examination and use.
(e) The term "statement", as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section in
relation to any witness called by the United States, means(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said
witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made
by said witness to a grand jury.
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1977).
34. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
35. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). In Mooney, the defendant had been convicted of first degree
murder. He sought habeas corpus relief from the United States Supreme Court, alleging
that the State of California had unlawfully restrained his liberty by using perjured testimony to obtain his conviction. Id. at 105.
36. Id. at 112. The Court stated that:
[1f a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is
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v. Kansas,3" another pre-Brady case, the Supreme Court held that
the solicitation of perjured testimony and the suppression of
favorable evidence had also violated the requirements of due
process."'
The law in this area remained relatively stable until the Supreme Court's decision in Alcorta v. Texas.3 9 In Alcorta an eyewitness to the crime gave testimony that the prosecution knew to be
false. The prosecution, however, failed to inform the court or the
defense. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and stated
that although the prosecution had not solicited the testimony in
question, that testimony had been so prejudicial to the accused as
to have deprived him of a fair trial.4"
In effect, the Alcorta decision expanded Mooney. In Mooney the
prosecution had intentionally used perjured testimony; Alcorta,
however, allowed for reversal merely when the false evidence was
uncorrected by the prosecution, regardless of whether the prosecution had solicited or intentionally used the perjured testimony.
The use of perjured testimony, however, was not the only means
by which the Court determined due process violations. In Napue v.
Illinois4' the Court held that the knowing use of false testimony,
which lends itself only to the credibility of a witness, is violative of
but used as a means of depriving a defendant of a liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured[,] isluch
a contrivance. . . is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.
Id. The Court denied relief, however, because the petitioner had not exhausted his state
remedies. Id. at 115.
37. 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Pyle, the petitioner had been convicted of murder and
robbery. He also had credible information that tended to prove that the prosecution had
forced persons to testify against him (using perjured testimony), and that favorable evidence had been suppressed. Id. at 214.
38. Id. at 216.
39. 355 U.S. 28 (1957). The petitioner had been convicted of first degree murder. He
argued that he had killed during a moment of passion, which passion was caused by seeing
his wife with another man. He suspected that his wife and the other man (the eyewitness)
were having an affair. If proved true, this would have supported his theory of killing in a
passionate moment. The prosecution knew that in fact the eyewitness had been sexually
involved with the petitioner's wife, but did nothing to correct the witness' statement on the
stand that he had not been involved with the petitioner's wife. Id.
40. Id. at 31-32.
41. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). In Napue, a witness, who was himself in prison in connection
with the same crime allegedly committed by the petitioner, had been promised consideration by the assistant state attorney general in return for his testimony. On questioning, the
witness denied that he had been given any consideration for his testimony. However, before
the jury went to deliberate, they were told that a public defender had promised to do what
he could for the witness. Id. at 265.
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due process if the prosecution does not correct the false testimony.
Such a violation occurs, according to the Napue Court, even if the
testimony does not go to the merits of the case.' 2 The Court maintained that a witness' testimony could be crucial in determining
guilt or innocence, and further that the credibility of a witness may
depend upon subtle factors such as the possible interest of a witness in rendering false or incorrect testimony.' 3 Accordingly, the
Court imposed an affirmative duty of disclosure upon the prosecution to correct such false testimony."
This prosecutorial duty lost much of its primary importance,
however, when the Court, in Brady v. Maryland,'45 placed the emphasis of due process violations upon the nature of the evidence. In
Brady, the petitioner and his companion had, in separate trials,
been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Prior to
Brady's trial, his counsel had requested production of an extrajudicial statement in which the companion had admitted to having
committed the killing. This statement did not come to light until
after Brady's conviction and sentence had been affirmed.' 6 The
Maryland Court of Appeals granted a new trial with respect to sentencing,'7 and the United States Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari. 8
In affirming the Maryland court, the Supreme Court looked to
42. Id. at 269-70.
43. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court relied partly on People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554,
557, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55 (1956), wherein the New York Court of
Appeals said:
It is no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness' credibility rather than
directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in
any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to
correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.
Id. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70.
44. 360 U.S. at 270. The Napue court also found applicable the Savvides Court's conclusion "[tihat the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to
prejudice matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could
in any real sense be termed fair." Id.
45. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 84. In reaching its decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals relied on United
States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1952), wherein the court held that
the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused not only conflicted with fundamental principles of liberty and justice, but had also denied the accused due process of
law. Id. at 820. The court also relied on Thompson v. Dye, 2221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955),
wherein the court held that the suppression of evidence which could have lowered the crime
from first to second degree murder, even where the defense had knowledge of the evidence
either before or during trial, was a denial of due process. 221 F.2d at 761.
48. Id. at 85.
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the effect that the statement would have had on the trial, and
whether the nondisclosure had hampered the defendant's ability to
adequately prepare his defense. The Court held that a denial of
due process occurs when material evidence, specifically requested
by the defense, has been suppressed by the prosecution, regardless
of the prosecution's good or bad faith."' Thus, with Brady the
prosecutor's duty of disclosure became of less importance, and the
nature of the evidence requested by the defense became determinative of a due process violation.50
Although Brady held that certain evidence must be disclosed in
order to avoid a due process violation, the Court did not fully explain what type of evidence or what type of request would trigger
the new rule. Specifically, the Brady Court failed to specify what
evidence is covered by the Brady rule and how specific the request
for such evidence would have to be. The first of these uncertainties
was answered some nine years later in Giglio v. United States.5 '
In Giglio the Court relied on Brady and Napue and held that
evidence is material if its introduction at trial would in all likelihood have "affected the judgment of the jury."5 Since evidence
49. 373 U.S. at 87. Specifically, the Court held that "the suppression ... of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Id. Continuing further, Justice Douglas stated:
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.
Id.
50. Justice Douglas further stated that:
A prosecution that witholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, even though . . . his action is not the 'result of guile'.
Id. at 87-88.
51. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In Giglio, the Court was faced with a similar factual setting as
had faced the Court in Mooney and Pyle. In Giglio, however, rather than focusing upon the
nature of the specific evidence, and whether the evidence itself had altered the decision of
the jury, the Court looked to whether perjured testimony had so discredited the witness as
to render all of the latter's testimony suspect and questionable by the jury. Id. at 154-55.
52. Id. at 154 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). Speaking through Chief Justice Burger, the Court stated:
We do not, however, automatically require a new trial whenever "a combing of the
prosecutor's files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense
but not likely to have changed the verdict ...
. . A finding of materiality of the
evidence is required under Brady . . . . A new trial is required if "the false testimony
could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . ."
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which bears on the credibility of a witness is likely to have such an
effect, the Court determined that such evidence is within the gen83
eral Brady rule.
The second problem raised by Brady-the specificity of the defense request for Brady material-was addressed in United States
v. Agurs, 4 where the Court stated that Brady arguably applies to
three different situations, each involving evidence discovered by
the defendant after the trial. According to the Court, the first situation arises when the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony; the second exists when the prosecution suppresses evidence
for which the defense has specifically made a request; and the
third arises when no request at all has been made, or in the alternative, when only a general request for Brady material or exculpatory evidence has been made."8
In addressing this third situation, the Court first noted that it
was dealing with the defendant's right to a fair trial and not with
the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure." According to the Court, this right may be implicated
at three different times: before, during or after completion of the
trial. 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that no
Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 154-55. Giglio does not stand for the proposition that the credibility of any
witness is enough to order a new trial; rather, the witness' testimony and his credibility
must have been of such a nature as to have been "determinative of guilt or innocence." See
id.
54. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the defendant, a prostitute, had been accused of
murdering one of her customers. The defendant claimed that, although totally unbruised
and uninjured, she had acted in self-defense. The prosecution was aware that the victim
possessed a criminal record which tended to indicate his violent tendencies; the evidence
would have supported a theory of self defense. The defense, which discovered the evidence
some three months after the trial, believed that it was material because it could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id at 100.
55. Id. at 104. The Court stated that a general request for exculpatory material or for
Brady material was tantamount to no request at all, since the prosecutor still had no notice
of that which the defense desired. Id. at 106.
The Court also noted that the test for setting aside a conviction in the first instance
would be met if a reasonable likelihood existed that the false testimony could have affected
the outcome of the jury. The test for setting aside a conviction is met in the second situation
if the evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 103-04.
56. Id. at 107. Although the court was dealing with the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, it was made clear that the same standards would apply to the states via the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
57. Id. at 107-08. The Court noted that the same standard must apply at both times,
"[f]or unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial. . . there was no breach of
the prosecutor's . . . duty to disclose." Id. at 108. However, the Court continued:
Nevertheless, there is a significant practical difference between the pretrial decision
of the prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge. Because we are dealing with
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constitutional duty existed to make available to the defense all evidence in the control of the prosecution."8
Further, the Court held that constitutional error should not be
measured by the outcome of the prosecutor's suppression, but
rather by the nature of the evidence suppressed. 59 In light of these
conclusions, the Court found that the defendant would have been
denied a fair trial only if the suppressed evidence would create a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, which doubt, in light of
the entire record, theretofore had not existed.6
The approach taken by the Third Circuit in this area has been
remarkably similar to that taken by the United States Supreme
Court, in that the Third Circuit has not attempted to broaden any
of the principles laid down in Brady, Giglio, or Agurs. One of the
first cases before the Third Circuit after Agurs was United States
v. Kaplan,6 1 where certain exculpatory evidence within the control
of the prosecution was not disclosed to the defense until part way
62
through the trial, but before the case had been sent to the jury.
The court refused to grant a new trial because the untimely disclosure had not denied the petitioner any due process guarantees
mandated under Brady. The court was satisfied that the defense
had been able to effectively use the exculpatory material during
63
the trial.

an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence
can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a
critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Id.
58. Id. at 109. The Court relied on Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972), which
held that "no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed
accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case" exists, and on In re
Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 569, 387 P.2d 6, 14 (1963), wherein the Supreme Court of California
indicated that prosecutors "are under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that
they learn about the case and about their witnesses." Id.
59. 427 U.S. at 110.
60. Id. at 112-13. The Court then concluded that the new evidence was not material,
and that thus a new trial was not in order. The Court was of the opinion that since the trial
judge, after having viewed the new evidence in light of the entire record, had not changed
his opinion as to the defendant's guilt, no reasonable doubt had been created. Id. at 113-14.
61. 554 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
62. The court criticized the untimely disclosure, as it had necessitated a delay during
which time the defense was allowed to examine the documents. The court was, however,
even more concerned with wasted court time, pointing out that a new trial would merely
result in a new jury hearing the same evidence. Id. at 580-81.
63. Id. at 580.
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A similar controversy faced the Third Circuit shortly thereafter
in Marzeno v. Gengler, " in which certain evidence which, although
requested, had been suppressed by the prosecution. Unlike the evidence in Kaplan, however, this evidence did not surface until after
the trial had concluded. The court held that Brady material included evidence that would tend to impeach the credibility of a
witness' testimony, where that testimony was crucial or "determinative" of the defendant's guilt or innocence.1 5 Although the court
found that the evidence involved fell within the purview of the
Brady rule, since it was exculpatory, such a determination was not
the end but rather the starting point from which to determine
whether the defendant had been denied a fair trial." The court
relied on Agurs at this point and stated that although evidence
may be exculpatory, it may also merely be repetitious or cumulative. Thus, the question to be asked was whether the evidence was
material, and, therefore, whether a new trial was required.6 7 The
court noted that materiality cannot be viewed in a vacuum; rather,
such a determination can only be made in light of the entire record. a8 Further, the test to be applied in determining materiality in
this instance was whether the outcome of the trial would have been
affected had this evidence been before the court during the trial. 9
Having found no such violation of fairness, the court affirmed the
conviction. 0
Most recently, the question of fairness was before the Third Cir64. 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978).
65. Id. at 735. In so holding, the court remained within the doctrinal scope of Giglio
concerning the role played by the witness-namely that the witness must somehow have
been instrumental in the conviction of the defendant. Id.
66. 574 F.2d at 735.
67. The court specifically stated:
Nevertheless, a finding by the reviewing court that the evidence is exculpatory in
nature does not end the inquiry. A conviction need not be vacated because evidence
that is "merely repetitious" or "cumulative" has not been revealed to the defendant. . . . Once evidence is found to be exculpatory, the question then focuses on
whether the omitted evidence was material to the finding of guilt in the original criminal trial.
Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 736.
69. Id. This test was the same that had been established in Agurs. In applying this
test, in light of the entire record, the court determined that although the evidence was exculpatory, and thus Brady material, and that the evidence had impinged the credibility of
the witness, the outcome of the trial would not have been affected. For that reason, no new
trial was granted, nor was the defendant's sentence vacated, as the defendant had been
afforded a fair trial according to the mandate of Brady. 574 F.2d at 738.
70. Id. at 738-39.
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cuit in United States v. Higgs.71 In Higgs the government refused,
after a court order, to release certain evidence to the defense. As a
result the district court sanctioned the government by forbidding
the government's witnesses from testifying at trial.7 2 The government appealed. The defense argued that the evidence was necessary in order to discover any exculpatory or impeaching evidence
concerning the witnesses; the government argued that the evidence
in its possession was not Brady material. The court noted that
Brady material does include exculpatory and impeaching evidence,
but noted that it was difficult at this stage to determine whether
the evidence sought, while arguably covered by Brady, was "material" in light of the fact that there was no trial record, and that the
roles to be played by the witnesses were uncertain. In the end, the
court concluded that whereas Brady is only a rule of fairness, the
defendant would not have suffered any due process violations if
the evidence were released in time for its effective use at trial.73
Upon first consideration, United States v. Starusko'appearsto
be in line with Brady and its progeny. In Starusko the court reaffirmed the longstanding notion that Brady is a rule of fairness and
minimum prosecutorial duty, and not a rule of discovery.74 Indeed,
the Starusko court reached the heart of the issue when it declared
75
that the undisclosed evidence had not prejudiced the defendant.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The Starusko court actually produced language which, though dicta, could mark a departure from the tenets of the Brady doctrine. The court allowed the
issue of materiality of the withheld evidence to be determined in a
vacuum.7 6 In so doing, the court created an inconsistent standard
71. 713 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1983). Higgs presents a factual scenario similar to Starusko:
as in the latter case, the evidence in Higgs could not have been viewed in light of a record,
as no complete record existed. In Higgs, the defense had unsuccessfully requested the names
and addresses of certain witnesses involved in the trial. The government, due to threats that
it had received against the lives of these witnesses, refused to turn over the requested evidence until after the witnesses had testified. Id.
72. Id. at 42.
73. Id. at 44.
74. 729 F.2d at 262.
75. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
[B]ecause the defendant suffered no prejudice from the government's failure to disclose the report, there was no Brady violation. Defense counsel's independent discovery of the statement-fortuitous though it was-negates any argument that the defendant was deprived of rights assured by the Constitution. Absent a showing of
prejudice, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in basing its preclusion order on a violation of Brady.
Id. (footnote omitted).
76. See 729 F.2d at 261 ("Moreover, we find the report to be material."). Although
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which could lead to anomalous decisions within the district courts.
The Starusko court held that there had been no Brady violation
because the defendant had suffered no prejudice attributable to
the prosecutor's misconduct. 7 However, the court confused the
point. No Brady violation had occurred not because the defendant
had suffered no prejudice from the government's failure to disclose; rather, no Brady violation had occurred because the evidence
was not material.
As noted in United States v. Agurs 7 1 Brady applies in three circumstances: perjured testimony, specifically requested evidence,
and unrequested evidence. 7 9 However, the mere fact that Brady
may be applicable in a given factual setting does not in and of itself require an automatic determination that Brady has been violated. Rather, a totality of the circumstances test must be used in
determining a derogation of the Brady doctrine. That is, while certain evidence may have the potential to rise to the level of materiality sufficient to trigger Brady, it is impossible to trigger Brady,
and a Brady violation cannot occur unless, with respect to the entire record, the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial.
This is more readily seen in Marzeno v. Gengler80 where the
Third Circuit held that while evidence may be exculpatory, it may
not have been material in the original determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence.8 1 For that reason, materiality, as defined
in Agurs,82 cannot be determined "in a vacuum"; rather, materiality can only be. understood with regard to the entire record in a
particular case. 83 More importantly, and perhaps more to the
point, however, is the notion that a Brady violation cannot occur
unless the evidence in question is material. 4 The conduct of the
acknowledging that "generally, it is difficult to analyze, prior to trial, whether potential impeachment evidence falls within Brady without knowing what role a certain witness will
play in the government's case," id., the court explicitly chose to abandon such a course.
Claiming that Logan was the "linchpin of the prosecution's case," the court ignored the
Brady doctrine and essentially jumped to the conclusion that the undisclosed evidence
"[was] material for impeachment purposes." Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. 427 U.S. 112 (1976).
79. Id. at 104-06.
80. 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978).
81. Id. at 735. The court stated that "once evidence is found to be exculpatory, the
question then focuses on whether the omitted evidence was material to the finding of guilt
in the original criminal trial." Id.
82. 427 U.S. at 104. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
83. See Marzeno, 574 F.2d at 736.
84. According to Agurs, a Brady violation only occurs when the suppressed evidence is
material. 427 U.S. at 104. Under this standard, evidence becomes material if its witholding
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prosecution has nothing to do with a determination of a Brady violation. A finding of materiality has everything to do with Brady85:
without materiality there can be no Brady violation. In Brady the
Court specifically held that a denial of due process would only occur if the evidence were material either to guilt or punishment." In
Giglio v. United States87 the court again reinforced the notion of
materiality being essential to the determination of Brady
material.8
Furthermore, evidence that is merely cumulative or repetitive is
not Brady material.8 9 This includes exculpatory or impeaching evidence. For example, had the Starusko case gone to trial without
the benefit of the second FBI report, and had Starusko been found
guilty, the report-which cast doubts upon Logan's credibility-might merely have been repetitious of that which had been
adduced during the trial. If such had occurred, a new trial would
not have been warranted. In that sense, the second FBI report
would have in no wise been material, and no Brady violation would
have occurred. The fact that the government had not in the first
instance disclosed the evidence would have been of no importance.
has caused an unfairness to the defendant. Id. at 103-04. The test employed by the court to
determine unfairness is whether in the eyes of the court the evidence might have affected
the outcome of the trial. Id. at 104. Necessarily, then, a Brady violation cannot be determined until, at least, a trial record has been established. See id. at 112:
The proper standard for materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error
has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context
of the entire record.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Marzeno, 574 F.2d at 736 ("Consequently, the standards of
materiality outlined in Agurs cannot be applied in a vacuum, but must be understood in
terms of the total record in a particular case.").
85. Perhaps the above may be more easily comprehended if we start with the basic
premise that all exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence, in its generic sense, falls within
the purview of Brady. Added to that, however, is the notion that the evidence must turn on
its own facts and be viewed in light of a totality of the circumstances after full development
of a trial record. If the evidence does not rise to the level of materiality it fails to become
Brady material. In other words, while certain classes of evidence by themselves have the
potential to be Brady material, they are not deemed to be Brady material if, when the
specific facts and circumstances are added to these generic classes of evidence, the specific
evidence involved (be it exculpatory or impeaching) is not material. Without materiality-which can only be determined in light of a record-there can be no true Brady
violation.
86. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962).
87. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
88. See supra note 52.
89. 574 F.2d at 735.
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Thus, the Starusko court was in error in determining that Brady
had not been violated solely because, by the time of trial, the defendant possessed the evidence in question. Obviously, no Brady
violation can occur if the defense possesses the evidence that was
sought; Brady will be violated only if the evidence is withheld and
is determined to be material. Without a completed trial record, the
court should not, and in fact could not have determined that the
second FBI report was material. While the court's conclusion that
Brady had not been violated was thus correct, the court's conclusion with respect to materiality was inconsistent with Brady and
its progeny."
In essence, the Starusko court made its determination not on
the nature of the evidence, but rather on the actions of the prosecutor. It is this determination, as discussed above, coupled with a
footnote in the case, 91 which potentially lays the foundation for the
disregard of the basic Brady doctrine and may allow for punishment of would-be Brady violations under the guise of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct.
In a footnote, the court stated that the same sanction imposed
by the district court-preclusion of Logan's testimony-might
have been a proper sanction if the district court had based the
sanction on its inherent authority to punish for the wilful disregard of a court order. 2 When coupled with the Starusko court's
premature determination of the materiality of the withheld evidence, this suggestion could take on a more significant meaning.
The Starusko court would, given the proper circumstances, apparently be willing to allow punishment of an alleged Brady violation
for reasons based not upon the nature of the evidence, but upon
90. As discussed above, the Brady doctrine only comes into play if the court determines that the undisclosed evidence is "material." If the evidence in question is determined
not to be material, Brady will not have been violated. The flaw in the reasoning employed
by the Starusko court is that if the evidence was indeed material, as the Starusko court
held, then Brady should have been triggered. To have remained consistent with Brady and
its progeny, the Starusko court should have held that the evidence in question was not
material.
In a sense, the Brady doctrine is similar to the exclusionary rule. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Both serve to deter, among other things, prosecutorial misconduct, but while the exclusionary rule relies most heavily on misconduct by police or prosecutor, Brady looks solely to the nature of evidence, rather than to the conduct of the
prosecutor.
91. 729 F.2d at 262 n.6. The footnote reads: "Had the district court not premised the
imposition of its sanction on a Brady violation, the sanction might have passed muster as a
valid exercise of its inherent authority to punish for the willful disregard of a court order."

Id.
92. Id.
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the conduct of the prosecution. Such a possibility would be inconsistent with the purpose behind Brady; in Brady the Supreme
Court focused on the nature of the evidence, and not upon the
good or bad faith of the prosecution. 3 That an inconsistent application of Brady would in fact transpire by such a seemingly independent sanction is clear. As discussed above, Starusko now apparently allows for a determination of materiality-and thus a
Brady violation-to be made without a trial record. In essence,
this would allow a trial judge to punish a recalcitrant prosecutor if
the judge were of the opinion that certain evidence within the control of the prosecution was Brady material. Notwithstanding the
characterization of the punishment, such a punishment would be
based upon the unjustified presumption that the evidence is material to the case. Under the guise of punishing wilful disregard of
court orders, the court would in fact be punishing the prosecution
for a presumed Brady violation. The Brady line of cases have been
adamant in their rejection of this result. Yet, the Starusko court
would apparently allow it.
The foregoing analysis can be demonstrated with the aid of an
illustration. If, upon a district court's order for prosecutorial disclosure of all Brady materials, the prosecution considered the evidence involved not to be Brady material, it would be inclined not
to disclose it. Because, under Starusko, the court may consider the
import of the evidence without respect to the broader context of
the case, the defense may now with greater ease approach the
court and ask for a sanction against the prosecution. Likewise,
under Starusko the court may then be able to impose a sanction
based on its "inherent authority to punish for the willful disregard
of a court order." Were the sanction to be upheld, as Starusko suggests that it would be, the district court will have effectively punished the prosecution for a Brady violation. With Starusko, the
emphasis thus appears to have shifted from the nature of the evidence withheld to prosecutorial behavior, a shift which the Brady
93. 373 U.S. at 87. See also Note, 61 WASH, U.L.Q. 163 (1983):
Brady v. Maryland marked a departure from the deterrence rationale: The Supreme
Court began to focus on the effect of nondisclosure on the defendant's capacity to
present his defense, rather than on the prosecutor's malfeasance. Brady and its progeny reasoned that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence deprives a
defendant of a fair trial, regardless of whether the nondisclosure is intentional or
merely negligent.
Id. at 175. Likewise, in United States v. Agurs, the Court stated that "[i]f the suppression of
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor." 427 U.S. at 110.
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cases have consistently rejected.
In essence, the Starusko court would allow a trial court to punish or impose sanctions for the nondisclosure of evidence, which
evidence may prove not to be Brady material.9 4 The ability of a
trial court to impose such a sanction would be a major setback for
prosecutors. Carried to its most extreme form, the holding could
very well necessitate the reformation of the prosecution's case in
chief for reasons which might very well never come into existence.
The government, fearing a pre-trial sanction based for all intents
and purposes upon Brady, might release certain evidence within its
control which, in light of the final trial record, would never have
been Brady material.
Although Starusko in many respects stays within the Brady notion of fairness, it also deviates from the basic rationale behind
Brady and its progeny. The holding allows for the punishment of
certain prosecutorial conduct by way of a non-doctrinal application
of Brady, punishment which in certain cases might not be warranted. As noted earlier, the Brady cases have consistently rejected
such an approach. For this reason, much of Starusko goes against
the grain of Brady and weakens the concepts upon which Brady
was based.
John D. Noel

94. In Higgs; a case upon which the Starusko court relied, the court was faced with
evidence without the benefit of a record. The Higgs court, however, never determined
whether the evidence involved was Brady material. Rather, the court assumed it to have
such a character:
It is difficult to analyze at this procedural stage whether potential impeachment material falls within Brady without knowing what role a certain witness will play in the
government's case. . . . In light of the government's concession at oral argument that
the requested information is Brady material, however, we need not resolve that issue
and will assume for the purposes of this appeal that the requested information must
be disclosed.
713 F.2d at 43 (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the
problem posed by the Agurs materiality standard, court stated: "Before trial the prosecutor
cannot know whether, after trial, particular evidence will prove to have been material. ...
Following their adversarial instincts, some prosecutors have determined unilaterally that
evidence will not be material and, often, in good faith, have disclosed it neither to defense
counsel nor to the court.") (emphasis added).

